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Abstract
In the last fifteen years or so the conduct of monetary policy in developed economies has
converged in a number of ways which include an increasing emphasis on ‘openness’ and
‘transparency’ in policy-making.
There is a widespread belief that transparency in the conduct of UK monetary policy has
increased substantially since, and because of, the introduction of inflation targeting and
associated institutional reforms in 1992. A large measure of this belief is based upon studies
which reveal the increased ability of money market agents to anticipate accurately the change in
official rates. In this paper, we have updated one of those studies and show that the findings are
largely unaffected by events of the last five years. More interestingly, perhaps, we have floated
the possibility that this improved anticipation may be the result of developments other than
institutional reforms. For example, it is notable that the Bank of England has made fewer and
smaller interest changes since 1992. It is also widely believed (and the behaviour of many macro
variables suggests this) that economies have generally become more stable since 1992. If this is
true, then macroeconomic forecasts in general should have improved and the increased
anticipation would be, partly at least, due to this rather than institutional changes. We test both
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1. Introduction
In the last fifteen years, there has been a striking convergence in the operation of monetary policy
by the major central banks. There has been a general agreement that independent central banks
help remove the inflation bias resulting from the time inconsistency of monetary policy when
conducted by elected governments. At much the same time, there emerged a consensus that some
short-term nominal interest rate was the appropriate instrument of policy (and even that it should
be set by the use of repo deals in government stock (Borio, 1997)). More recently, we have seen
the widespread adoption of direct inflation targeting and steps to increase the openness or
‘transparency’ of monetary policy decision-making.
As we shall see, the evidence that transparency in monetary policy has increased, comes
now in a variety of forms, ranging from a ‘characteristics’ approach, reminiscent of the tests for
central bank independence of some fifteen years ago, through surveys of the views of
practitioners in financial markets to ‘direct’ tests of agents’ ability to anticipate policy actions
based on the behaviour of short-term market interest rates.
Whatever form the tests take, the consensus is that transparency has increased. At worst,
some evidence could be taken as inconclusive; but there is a widespread belief, based on the
majority of the studies, that agents have a better understanding of the conduct of monetary policy
and that this has come about as a result of institutional and procedural changes introduced by
central banks themselves.
Such a consensus amongst economists should always be regarded with suspicion (and no
doubt with disbelief by the media). The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to raise and to
test the possibility that the improved ability of agents to anticipate the behaviour of the UK’s
central bank in the setting of interest rates, comes from some other source altogether. We
consider two possible sources. The first is the change in the Bank’s own interest setting
behaviour, whereby changes in the official rate have become smaller and less frequent. The
second is rather more far-reaching and looks at whether the macroeconomy itself has become
more stable and more easily forecastable. If so, then the anticipation of policy response is just a
special case of the general predictability of the economy.  As a result of the greater stability,
everything is easier to foresee and this includes official decisions about interest rates.3
In section 2 we look briefly at some of the tests of transparency that have taken place in
recent years, distinguishing the various approaches but concentrating on those which have
featured the behaviour of market interest rates.
In section 3 we estimate a model of market interest rate behaviour which enables us to
measure the degree of surprise occurring on the day of an announcement of a change in the policy
rate. The model is essentially similar to that used in other studies and our purpose in estimating it
here is simply to update previous studies to ensure that nothing has changed in the meantime. The
model includes a dummy variable for ‘1992’, the year in which inflation targeting was adopted,
so that we can compare the degree of anticipation over the whole sample period with that which
has occurred since the adoption of that particular regime. Our estimations suggest that the earlier
findings have been unaffected by recent events and that therefore the hypothesis that transparency
has increased since the introduction of inflation targeting remains apparently well-supported.
In section 4 we test two alternative hypotheses. The first is that the change in the Bank’s
own operating procedures may have made it easier to anticipate changes in the official rate. Our
results show, surprisingly in our view, that the smaller and less frequent changes in interest rates
since 1992 have not contributed significantly to agents’ improved ability to anticipate official
moves. The second is that the UK economy, like many others, has behaved in a more stable
manner since the early 1990s and that consequently, with lower uncertainty, many things have
become easier to foresee.  We test this by looking at the forecast errors from a wide range of
private sector forecasts. A necessary condition for our hypothesis to hold is that we should see a
general reduction in the size of these errors over time. It is not obvious that these errors have
diminished.
In section 5 we summarise and conclude.
2. The story so far
The arguments for transparency are well-known and we shall not repeat them in detail.. Very
briefly, they include a link with credibility in so far as being open about the inflation target and
operating methods makes it easier for agents to hold the central bank to account. Through this
link the sacrifice ratio is reduced. (Chortareas et al., 2003). A second argument is that
transparency, when it extends to the model of the economy with which the policy-makers are
operating, helps anchor the public’s expectations about future policy moves (Bean, 1998 p.1796).
This is the main argument behind the Bank of England’s ambition to make monetary policy
‘boring’ (King, 1997, p.440). If agents understand how the central bank’s mind works, then they
can anticipate the next policy move, as though they were making policy for themselves. In these
circumstances, the ‘news’ is in current economic developments and not in any subsequent interest4
rate change that the central bank might initiate in response. If this can be achieved, then monetary
policy actions themselves no longer risk adding to the noise and general instability in the
economy. A third argument follows from the breakdown of the policy ineffectiveness
proposition. This is that monetary policy actions do have an effect upon the real economy but that
the transmission mechanism often involves medium or long-term interest rates, while the policy
instrument is invariably a very short-term rate. What links the two is often said to be
‘expectations’ and from this it is argued that agents’ expectations are more likely to be correct if
they fully understand the thinking behind the authorities’ actions. If all this is true, then policy
transparency enhances the effectiveness of stabilisation policy. (Blinder et al., 2001; De Haan and
Amtenbrink, 2002; Woodford, 2001; Freedman, 2002). Two major surveys of the transparency
literature are provided by Hahn (2002) and Geraats (2002).
Whether the steps taken to increase transparency have actually achieved that end (and
brought the benefits) is another matter. Typically, transparency is said to be enhanced by some or
all of: a fixed schedule of policy decision dates; the publication of the minutes of the meeting at
which the decision is taken; publication of the voting record (where a committee is involved); a
quantified inflation target; publication of the macroeconomic data underlying the decision; and an
explanation of the macromodel used by the policy-makers. For the UK, these are developments
which for the most part accompanied the introduction of inflation targeting in 1992.
2
Early studies of the amount of transparency in any given regime proceeded by checking
off these ‘characteristics’ against the operating procedures of each major central bank, in a
manner very similar to that of the early central bank independence work. Examples include: Fry
et al ( 2000), Eijffinger and Geraats (2002), De Haan and Amtenbrink  (2002) and Gros and Bini-
Smaghi (2000). But more recent work has focused on the evidence revealed by the behaviour of
money market interest rates. The argument here is that money market practitioners are well-
informed professionals, responsible for managing large volumes of funds on which very small
movements in interest rates can mean significant gain or loss. Expectation that the central bank is
going to raise rates, for example, will entail the matching expectation that money market
instruments of that maturity will fall in value. Dealers will sell to avoid the loss and money
market instruments will show the change in price/yield before the date of the announcement.
Those papers that have tested money market responses to official interest changes as
evidence of transparency are, in effect, bringing together two sets of ideas each of which
independently goes back some way.
3 On the one hand there is the theoretical argument that
                                                          
2  See Bowen (1995) for a discussion of the thinking behind the switch to inflation targeting and the institutional
changes which accompanied it. Also Haldane (1997).
3 One might argue for three sets of literature. Looking for signs that markets anticipate official announcements is
very reminiscent of the ‘event study’ approach to testing the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. The5
secrecy in policy making influences the volatility of asset prices. Goodfriend (1986) and Dotsey
(1987), for example, showed that secrecy in policy making lowered the unconditional volatility of
interest rates. However, lowering the unconditional variance of asset prices implies raising the
conditional variance.  Secrecy shrinks the feasible information set of agents; it makes the
authorities’ reaction function less transparent. As a result, secrecy induces larger and more
frequent forecasting errors. In the case of monetary policy, for ‘asset prices’ read ‘interest rates’.
The other, more voluminous, literature concerns the link between official rates (or other monetary
policy announcements) and market rates. Included here is the work of Shiller, Campbell and
Shoenholtz (1983), Hardouvelis (1984) for monetary policy news in general; and Cook and Hahn
(1989), Radecki and Reinhart (1994), Dale (1993), Hardy (1996).
For the USA, Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) have all
documented the ability of money markets to anticipate monetary policy changes, the latter
showing that anticipation has improved since the Federal Reserve began announcing its target for
the Federal Funds rate in 1994. One of the earliest market-based studies of  transparency was
done by Daniel Hardy for the IMF in 1998. It showed that German money markets had little
difficulty in anticipating Bundesbank interest rate decisions. In 2002, again for the IMF, Ross
looked at the performance of the ECB after three years of operation. and compared it with the
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. He found that ‘… all three central banks are relatively
predictable institutions.’
For the UK two papers, by Chadha and Nolan (1999) and Caporale and Cipollini (2001),
approach the question of transparency through the volatility of market rates. The former tested for
a direct relationship between interest rate volatility in the UK and transparency measured by (i)
the publication of minutes of the MPC meetings, (ii) the effects of announcements on the interest
rate decisions of the MPC and (iii) the publication of the Inflation Report. None of these factors
seemed to affect volatility significantly.  They also experimented with dummy variables
accounting for days on and before announcement day and found mixed significant effects from
these dummies on volatility over selected periods in the UK.
   They conclude that their results are
‘… simply picking up the fact that markets are continually adapting to new information’ (Chadha
and Nolan, 1999, p.20).  Caporale and Cipollini (2001) found that in Euroland and the US
volatility is higher before the change in policy rate than after the decision, which may indicate
that agents adjust to information before the policy change relatively more than after the change.
The paper by Haldane and Read (2000) looked at the effect of monetary policy ‘surprises’
on the yield curve. Its relevance to us is that it finds (for the UK) that the effects of policy news
                                                                                                                                                                                           
market is semi-strong form efficient if the news (of earnings, takeover bid etc.) is in the price by the time of its
official announcement.6
on the short end of the yield curve have diminished since the introduction of inflation targeting
(though they remain high by comparison with the US and with Germany). This, they put down to
the increasing transparency of policy. The sample in the Haldane and Read paper is 1984 to 1997
and they look at the response of interest rates of eight different maturities up to 20 years. In the
section that follows, we examine the surprise contained in changes in market rates at four
maturities at the shorter end and we bring the story more up to date by using data to the autumn
of 2003.
Taken together, market-based tests of transparency show remarkable agreement that
monetary policy making by the major central banks, including the Bank of England, have made
considerable progress in communicating their approach to interested agents. In the next section,
using an approach similar to that of Haldane and Read (2000), we update the situation for the UK
before going on to consider the hypothesis that this apparent increased transparency in policy-
making may be due to circumstances other than procedural and institutional innovations.
3 Updating the evidence
Participants in money markets lend to each other at different maturities. Banks that lend on
money markets will not borrow from each other at rates that differ greatly from that of the
Central Bank. Money market interest rates thus reflect the actual and expected path of the official
interest rate. If money market participants expect the Central Bank to change the official rate,
short-term money market rates will incorporate agents’ expectations over future Central Bank
official rates for the reasons of commercial self-interest that we referred to in the last section. To
the extent that agents guess correctly, money market rates will change before the change in the
official rate occurs. We refer to this as anticipation of monetary policy.
How do agents form expectations of future official rates?  If the official rate is set
according to a monetary policy rule, a Taylor-type rule, for example, then, provided that the
central bank published the rule, agents would have a relatively simple task. However, central
banks have always denied that they operate such a rule, at least in a mechanical way, while not
denying that the size of the ‘output gap’ and the divergence of current inflation from target are
important inputs to their decisions. After all, if monetary policy decisions were simple rule-
driven, one would not require a Monetary Policy Committee and two days of deliberation to
make them (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001).
This does, of course, raise the question of how exactly agents do form their judgments of
the next change in rates. In the course of preparing the data for the estimations (described below)
we took steps to avoid introducing any bias in the results by ensuring that we omitted any case
where a change in the official rate was clearly foreshadowed by any comment from a senior7
member of the Bank of England.
4 We did this by reviewing the Financial Times in the seven days
prior to any change. In practice we found no such cases but the investigation did reveal very
clearly the way in which the Financial Times formed its judgements about the impending rate
decision. This was done by looking at the voting record at the previous meeting and looking at
any major macroeconomic news that had appeared in the meantime. Thus, if the vote had been 5
for leaving the rate unchanged and 4 for raising it and in the interim the CSO had released data
about faster than expected growth in GDP, the FT would be confident in its prediction of a rate
rise. (On the evidence of this rather unscientific survey, the FT was generally correct). Two
working papers by the Spanish investment bank BBVA, suggest that ECB and Federal Reserve
interest rate decisions are well-predicted by a forward-looking Taylor rule (Doménech, Ledo and
Taguas 2000 and 2001). In the circumstances, it is obviously possible that traders do forecast on
the basis of a Taylor rule even though central banks deny using one. We simply do not know.
However, because policy decisions are to some degree discretionary, agents do not have
perfect knowledge of future Central Bank policy. Depending on the amount of Central Bank
transparency, some degree of surprise will remain and the yield curve will jump on the day of
announcement, where the size of the jump depends on the extent of Central Bank transparency.
To extract some measure of policy surprise along the yield curve, we estimate the change
in the market interest rate as follows (see Haldane and Read, 2000):
,, () 9 2 ( 1 ) tj j j tj j t j t t mar c L mar pol D pol e βλ δ ∆= +∆+ ∆ + ∆ +
The subscript j stands for the term to maturity. The variable mar indicates the market rate, pol
stands for the official rate and D92 is an impulse dummy with the value 1 from November 1992
and zero otherwise.
We use daily data for the UK from January 1984 until mid-October 2003. The market
interest rates are the yields on Certificates of Deposits with a maturity of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months.
This gave us about 5000 observations on each maturity. During this period, the Bank of England
changed the official rate exactly 100 times.
Lags of the dependent variable were included to reduce serial correlation. However, as the
results below show, most of the lags are insignificant. The coefficient λ measures the average
interest rate surprise over the full sample. If λ=0, the market rate does not change in response to
the change in the official rate and policy was fully anticipated before the Central bank changed
the official rate. Similarly, if λ=1, market agents are completely taken by surprise by Central
Bank policy with all adjustment taking place on the day of announcement.
                                                          
4 At Charles Goodhart’s suggestion.8
The coefficient δ measures the effect of the inflation target regime and its transparency
reforms on average interest rate surprises. Those reforms include the publication of the inflation
report, scheduled meetings and the publication of minutes of monthly monetary meetings, to
name a few. If δ=0, then there is no (downward) shift in interest rate surprises caused by the more
transparent regime in the recent period. If transparency causes agents to find it easier to anticipate
Bank of England policy, we expect the sign of δ to be negative. The sum of the coefficients λ and
δ measures the size of the average interest rate surprise along the yield curve during the later
period of inflation targeting and greater Central Bank transparency.
Table 1 below shows the results of equation (1). The model was estimated using OLS.
The last column of Table 1, which reports the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation of up
to order 15, shows that all equations have significant levels of serial correlation. In the light of
this, the t-values in brackets in Table 1 are calculated on the basis of Newey-West adjusted
standard errors to ensure consistency.
Table 1: The policy surprise in short-term interest rates
























































Turning first to 
2 R , we note that between 2 and 13 per cent of the average variation in the market
rate is explained by the model. The policy surprise coefficient λ is significant along throughout
the yield curve. Taking the sample period as a whole, between about 25 and 45 per cent of a
policy rate change comes as a surprise on the day of the announcement when considering the total
sample period. The exception to this is the surprise effect of only 13 per cent for the 3-month CD
rate. On the whole, this nevertheless suggests that actual Central Bank policy is some news to
agents and shifts the yield curve on the day of announcement. These results indicate that the Bank
of England has an information advantage on macroeconomic development over private agents.9
The coefficient of the dummy variable is also significant throughout the yield curve (again, with
the exception of the 3-month CD-rate) suggesting that the change to institutional arrangements
with the introduction of inflation targeting has improved transparency. This is confirmed when
we look at the later period (from  November 1992 onwards), where only about between 8 and 11
per cent of the policy rate changes are not anticipated on the day of announcement.
4. Alternative possibilities
The results in the previous section suggest that transparency and inflation targeting improved
agents’ ability to anticipate monetary policy. The questions we want to address here are, firstly,
whether the recent improvement in policy anticipation may be due to the recent period of
relatively infrequent and only moderate (usually 25 basis points) changes in the official rate.
Secondly, we test whether macreconomic forecasting has improved over the last 10 years or so. If
this were the case, then the gain in Central Bank policy anticipation may (at least partly) be
explained by agents’ improved predictions of the future development of the economy.
Turning to the first question, it seems reasonable to assume that when Central Banks do
not change the official rate over long periods of time (because of a stable macroeconomy or
otherwise) and when  they change it, they change it by a constant amount, agents may find it
easier to predict official rate moves. Higher volatility increases agents’ uncertainty of the future
and will make it more difficult for agents to anticipate policy changes. If  it was more difficult to
anticipate official rate changes before 1992, because of the manner in which changes were made,
then we must credit this change in operating procedure in the later period with some of the
increased anticipation which has hitherto been put down to the greater release of information.  To
test for this, we compared the number and magnitude of policy changes between the pre- and post
October 1992 periods. In the earlier period, the median of policy changes was 50 basis points,
compared to a median of 25 basis points in the more recent period. During the first nine years, the
official rate was changed 62 times, compared with 38 times over the following eleven years. In
the first period, 24 per cent of all changes were sign changes, compared with 18 per cent of sign
changes in the later period.
We measure uncertainty as the absolute change in the policy rate over time. The graph
below shows the absolute change in the policy rate between consecutive changes in the official
rates. The vertical axis shows the changes in the official rate in percentage points. Clearly, as the
statistics above summarised, the graph illustrates that the policy rates changed more frequently
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In order to test whether Central Bank policy anticipation was more difficult during the times of
greater volatility, we constructed an additional variable which we added to the model in (1). This
variable ( 25 jt pol γ ∆ ) only contained absolute policy changes of more than 25 basis points.
,, ( ) 25 92 (2) tj j j tj j t j t j t t mar c L mar pol pol D pol e βλ γ δ ∆= +∆+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
 We expect the coefficient γ to be positive if greater uncertainty made it more difficult for agents
to anticipate policy changes. The sum of the coefficients λ and γ measures the average degree of
surprise during the period of greater Central Bank policy variability. In other words, γ measures
the additional surprise generated by increased uncertainty. Likewise, an insignificant coefficient
of γ would indicate that greater official rate changes do not affect agents’ ability to anticipate
Central Bank policy.
The results of the estimation including the momentum variable  25 jt pol γ ∆  are shown in
Table 2, where the coefficient γ measures the size of its effect.11
Table 2: The effect of large and frequent interest rate changes
j Rate c






























































Note: OLS estimation and Newey-West adjusted t-values in brackets.
Except for the change in the yield on the 1-month CD, the momentum variable is
insignificant while the remaining coefficients have not changed much compared to the results in
Table 1. On the basis of these results, we reject the hypothesis that official rate volatility reduced
anticipation.  Returning to Figure 1, most of the greater changes in the official rate occur in the
earlier period. We suspected that the combined dummy/policy variable distinguishing between
the earlier and later periods measures some of the momentum variable effect. However, the
correlation coefficient between the period dummy and the momentum variable is -0.156 and the
correlation coefficient between the momentum variable and the policy variable is 0.271. It seems
surprising, but on this evidence we are forced to conclude that it was not obviously more
difficult for agents to anticipate Central Bank policy when the official rate moves substantially.
A second possibility that may explain (some of) the rise in policy anticipation since 1992
is, that macroeconomic forecasting in general has improved since the introduction of inflation
targeting.
5 Forecasting improvements may come about through better econometric models and
techniques, or, through a more stable macroeconomy. All should improve agents’ ability to
predict variables like inflation or GDP growth and, if the central bank’s reaction function is
well-understood, this will feed through to a better anticipation of changes in the official rate. If
private agents (in particular) have improved their forecasting ability over time, then what
                                                          
5 We could have formulated our hypothesis sharper by comparing the forecasting ability of agents of
macroeconomic variables before and after October 1992. However, we were constrained by the data to limit our
attention to 1994 onwards.12
appears as a  gain in Central Bank policy transparency may be due the generally increased ‘ease’
of forecasting.
In order to test this hypothesis, we look at private agents’ forecast errors of real
economic growth and inflation over time. The data come from Consensus Forecasts which
publish the mean (or consensus) forecasts of a group of mainly private economic forecasters, of
a range of variables. We use their quarterly and annual forecasts from 1994 Q1 until 2003 Q4.
Figure 1 shows the behaviour of quarterly (QFGDP) and annual (AFGDP) forecast errors of
GDP.
Figure 1




































For most of the period, forecast errors for GDP growth are fairly low, particularly for the
quarterly forecasts. There is though a substantial under forecast in 1994 and in 2000. The latter
may be connected with the sharp fall in equity markets where agents may have tended to over-
predict the effect on the economy and the following brief stagnation.
The following figure shows the quarterly and annual forecast errors for inflation rates. The
measure for inflation is the change in the retail price index excluding mortgage payments.
Generally, forecasting errors of inflation are lower than those for GDP growth with quarterly
forecasts doing better again than annual forecasts. One-year-ahead inflation is badly predicted in
1996/7.13
Figure 2

































However, in neither figure does there appear to be any systematic change in forecasting errors over time.
This result is confirmed by the regressions presented in Table 3, where the forecast errors of GDP and
inflation are regressed on a constant and trend. If forecast errors declined over time, we would expect the
coefficient of the trend variable to be significantly negative.
Table 3: DGP and inflation forecast errors over time


















2 R 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.21
LM 18.88* 24.78* 1.3 5.41*
Note: Newey-West adjusted standard errors and covariances. ‘*’ indicates that the coefficient is
significant at the 5% level or less.
The coefficient of the trend variable in all cases is insignificant, except for the one-year-ahead inflation
forecast. Notice though that this coefficient is positive, indicating, if nothing else, that inflation forecasts
one-year ahead have become worse over time. For all other estimations, the results confirm the lack of14
any trend shown in figures 1 and 2. This suggests, that private sector’s ability to forecast macro economic
variables have not changed in the UK over the last 10 years.
The extreme high annual under-predictions of GDP growth at the end of 1994 and at the end of 1999, the
beginning of 2000, may have influenced our estimation results. Outliers are also present for the quarterly
forecast of GDP growth at roughly the same times. We re-estimated the equations for GDP growth in the
table above, this time eliminating the outliers. The coefficients on the trend variable did not change in
either of the estimations.
Taking all the evidence together, we cannot say that apparent gains in transparency are the result of a
general improvement in private agent’s ability to anticipate the behaviour of the macroeconomy at large.
Therefore, it appears that the gain in Central Bank policy anticipation is not due to agents’ improving
their forecasting abilities. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the increase in transparency owes
something to the deliberate adoption of inflation targeting and other procedural innovations.
V Summary and conclusion
In the last fifteen years or so the conduct of monetary policy in developed economies has
converged in a number of ways. One much-documented trend has been the move to central bank
independence. In the last few years, however, a number of central banks have placed increasing
stress on the transparency and openness of their policy-making procedures on the grounds that
this improves monetary policy outcomes. A variety of studies, of very different types, have set
out to measure the degree of (and changes in) the transparency of different regimes.
There is a widespread belief that transparency in the conduct of UK monetary policy has
increased substantially since, and because of, the introduction of inflation targeting and
associated institutional reforms in 1992. A large measure of this belief is based upon studies
which reveal the increased ability of money market agents to anticipate accurately the change in
official rates. In this paper, we have updated one of those studies and show that the findings are
largely unaffected by events of the last five years. More interestingly, perhaps, we have floated
the possibility that this improved anticipation may be the result of developments other than
institutional reforms. For example, it is notable that the Bank of England has made fewer and
smaller interest changes since 1992. Intuitively, this generally more stable environment should
have made it easier to anticipate official changes when they do occur. But adding a variable
representing the greater volatility of interest changes pre-1992, does not add anything to our
ability to forecast official changes. The reduction in volatility does not, therefore, seem to be
responsible for the improved anticipation. It is also widely believed (and the behaviour of many15
macro variables suggests this) that economies have generally become more stable since 1992. If
this is true, then macroeconomic forecasts in general should have improved and the increased
anticipation would be, partly at least, due to this rather than institutional changes. But
macroeconomic forecasts seem not to have improved over the last 10 years or so.
For the time being, we are left with the conclusion the monetary policy does now contain
fewer surprises and that this owes something to the introduction of inflation targeting and the
associated steps toward more openness.
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